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24) A Decision Boils Down to…

By Steve Salisbury , Bogota, Colombia, February 23, 2016

The debate boils down to: Are the terms to which Pres Santos and the FARC leadership agreeing an acceptable price to pay for peace—aimed to save lives, open Colombia to greater development and prosperity for a wider range of its population, expand democratic participation, fortify the Constitution and institutionality, and contribute to national/international security—as Pres. Santos, the FARC and other peace-process supporters argue?

Or, as Uribe argues, would it eventually result in the fuelling of future (perhaps worse) violence, greater drug-trafficking and other crime, and threaten Colombia’s Constitution and institutionality, not only to the detriment of Colombia, but also to that of the international community, because it would tinker supposedly harmfully with Colombia’s Constitutional and institutional balance and would allow those who confess involvement in grave war crimes or with illegal drugs-crops to not go to jail, and thus it would supposedly perhaps be an incentive for present and future outlawed groups to grow their strength to try to get similar judicial benefits?

Peace to Pain
Going from bottom to top, the words appear to read (if inadvertently): “pain” in English to “paz” (“peace” in Spanish). Or read from top to bottom, it could be seen as “paz” to “pain.” Colombians will decide how their future unfolds. © Photo by Steve Salisbury. All rights reserved.

That is for Colombians to decide; they have to forge their own destiny, even though the international community can try to help and does help with some things.

But if Colombians (or others) are ever to reconcile, they are going to have to take the steps, even starting with baby steps. Stresses Harvard conflict-resolution expert William Ury, a helpful start would be to replace hostility with hospitality. As Ury quoted US President Abraham Lincoln in an especially important meeting where I was present, “Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?”

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Filed Under: Where Is the Colombian Peace Process Headed? Not So Fast…

About the Author:

Steve Salisbury is a private consultant with a background in media as a photojournalist, war correspondent, TV producer, analyst and commentator, covering Latin America. Read More…

Index

  • Preface
  • Introduction: Difficult Complexities Yet to Resolve, Despite Evidently Growing Optimism
  • 1) No Colombian Government-FARC Overall Peace Agreement by March 23 and No Guarantee for It in 2016
  • 2) What about Colombia’s Second-Largest Guerrilla Group, the “National Liberation Army” (ELN), in This?
  • 3) FARC Unilateral “Indefinite” Cease-Fire or Undeclared “Bilateral” Cease-Fire, and Eventual Declared Bilateral “Definitive” Cease-Fire
  • 4) Could Calls for a Military Solution Spike on Potential, New Frustrations over Prolonged Talks? What Is the Balance of Forces?
  • 5) With the Colombian State’s Overwhelming Military Superiority, Why Even Have Peace Talks with the Guerrillas?
  • 6) What Would Happen with No Peace Talks?
  • 7) Plan Colombia and the Peace Talks
  • 8) “Black-Op” Smart Bombs, FARC Decision-Making Structure
  • 9) Human Rights
  • 10) Why Is the FARC Still in Arms? Its Roots, What Does It Want?
  • 11) What about FARC Weapons? What about the Colombian Armed Forces after an Overall Peace Accord Is Signed?
  • 12) Would There Be Armed Dissident or Splinter Groups Peeling Away from the FARC after an Overall Peace Accord?
  • 13) Does the FARC See the Clock Winding Down on Pres. Santos a “Strategic Advantage”?
  • 14) Does the FARC Want to Run the Clock Out on Pres Santos and Wait for the Next President (Who Could Be Better or Worse for the FARC)?
  • 15) What Can Be Done to Keep Up Confidence in the Peace Process among Colombian Public Opinion? “Memo of Understanding” to End Conflict
  • 16) Some Things that Could Risk to Undercut Confidence in Peace Process
  • 17) Smoke-and-Mirrors Impunity or an Historic Brilliant Balance between Peace and Justice in Victims’/Justice Agreement?
  • 18) Pres. Santos Ceding Too Much or Not?
  • 19) Would Pres. Santos’ Cure Be Worse than the Malady, or The Best, Simplest Way? The Question of Ratifying an Eventual Overall Peace Accord
  • 20) Former President/Now Senator Uribe’s Possible Next Moves? The Retired Military Voice, Political Parties
  • 21) Other Questions about the Victims’/Justice Agreement
  • 22) Extradition, Cooperation on International Judicial and Security Issues
  • 23) The FARC’s “Simon Trinidad”
  • 24) A Decision Boils Down to…
  • Sidebar: Some of the Hardest Issues to Resolve at This Juncture in Colombian Peace Process

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More On

Sidebar: Some of the Hardest Issues to Resolve at This Juncture in Colombian Peace Process

What about the FARC and extradition?

What about the FARC's "Simon Trinidad"?

Justice or impunity?

Will time run out on Pres. Santos?

A "Memo of Understanding" to End War, if March 23 "deadline" Is Missed?

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