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13) Does the FARC See the Clock Winding Down on Pres. Santos a “Strategic Advantage”?

By Steve Salisbury , Bogota, Colombia, February 23, 2016

Yes. While the current posts of FARC leaders aren’t dependent on four-year election cycles or term limits, Pres. Santos’ or any Colombian president’s is. This could be seen as putting by definition any president at a disadvantage regarding time, of which the FARC has a different concept hanging out in jungles for about 52 years. On top of that, Pres. Santos has staked his presidency on the peace process, passionately repeated statements of his profound yearning for an overall peace accord to be signed during his presidency, and a Nobel peace prize could be awarded for it. Is it a mere coincidence that Pres. Santos had the formal peace talks ceremonially inaugurated in Oslo in 2012 and Norway included as a “guarantor” country, along with host Cuba, at the peace table? (Chile and Venezuela are “accompanying” countries to the Colombian peace process.)

So, it wouldn’t be surprising for FARC leaders or anyone to think that this could predispose Santos to more flexibility or ceding on issues as the clock on his presidency ticks closer toward its expiration.

Whether President Santos likes it or not, he is being perceived (unfairly or not) as showing apparent signs of “over-anxiousness” for an overall peace accord, and this would presumably handicap him and weaken his own negotiating position. Pres. Santos would deny both that he is “over-anxious” and that he has handicapped himself. Moreover, Santos has said that what he does is “millimetricly” planned.

But doubts about this were raised even among some of Pres. Santos’ own supporters, as well as among his critics, when breaking news of his out-of-the-blue Havana trip for the signing ceremony on victims and justice surprised the public and smacked to some of political overtones to give a big breath of air to the Colombian peace process a month before Colombia’s October 25 regional/local elections and to have big good news on the peace process before Pres. Santos spoke at the United Nations in late September.

Alfonso Cano
The FARC’s “Alfonso Cano” in the “Distension Zone.” Cano eventually became the maximum leader of the FARC, but was killed by soldiers in 2011. © Photo by Steve Salisbury. All rights reserved.

The FARC received a big boost itself by having its maximum leader “Timochenko” standing together and shaking hands in a big flourish three-way with Pres. Santos and Raul Castro. Pres. Santos looked stiff and uncomfortable, unsmiling, as if he were unexpectedly roped into the handshake by Raul joining the hands of Santos, “Timochenko” and Raul. Colombian former president/now Senator Alvaro Uribe and his Centro Democratico political opposition party complained that this, in their view, apparently or by implication put Pres. Santos and “Timochenko” on the same level and supposedly bestowed “legitimacy” in an unnecessary and undeserved way to the FARC, when the FARC has yet to lay down its weapons. Pres. Santos denies this.

But, the international humanitarian diplomat observed, the public handshakes between the top leaders of negotiating sides—like the now famous or infamous (depending on one’s point of view) three-way handshake together by an unsmiling Pres. Santos, the FARC’s smiling “Timochenko” and a beaming Raul Castro at the Havana ceremony last September 23—usually come after the signing of an overall agreement at the end of negotiations. Paraphrasing what an American university academic wrote to me: What is there now to top that?

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Filed Under: Where Is the Colombian Peace Process Headed? Not So Fast…

About the Author:

Steve Salisbury is a private consultant with a background in media as a photojournalist, war correspondent, TV producer, analyst and commentator, covering Latin America. Read More…

Index

  • Preface
  • Introduction: Difficult Complexities Yet to Resolve, Despite Evidently Growing Optimism
  • 1) No Colombian Government-FARC Overall Peace Agreement by March 23 and No Guarantee for It in 2016
  • 2) What about Colombia’s Second-Largest Guerrilla Group, the “National Liberation Army” (ELN), in This?
  • 3) FARC Unilateral “Indefinite” Cease-Fire or Undeclared “Bilateral” Cease-Fire, and Eventual Declared Bilateral “Definitive” Cease-Fire
  • 4) Could Calls for a Military Solution Spike on Potential, New Frustrations over Prolonged Talks? What Is the Balance of Forces?
  • 5) With the Colombian State’s Overwhelming Military Superiority, Why Even Have Peace Talks with the Guerrillas?
  • 6) What Would Happen with No Peace Talks?
  • 7) Plan Colombia and the Peace Talks
  • 8) “Black-Op” Smart Bombs, FARC Decision-Making Structure
  • 9) Human Rights
  • 10) Why Is the FARC Still in Arms? Its Roots, What Does It Want?
  • 11) What about FARC Weapons? What about the Colombian Armed Forces after an Overall Peace Accord Is Signed?
  • 12) Would There Be Armed Dissident or Splinter Groups Peeling Away from the FARC after an Overall Peace Accord?
  • 13) Does the FARC See the Clock Winding Down on Pres. Santos a “Strategic Advantage”?
  • 14) Does the FARC Want to Run the Clock Out on Pres Santos and Wait for the Next President (Who Could Be Better or Worse for the FARC)?
  • 15) What Can Be Done to Keep Up Confidence in the Peace Process among Colombian Public Opinion? “Memo of Understanding” to End Conflict
  • 16) Some Things that Could Risk to Undercut Confidence in Peace Process
  • 17) Smoke-and-Mirrors Impunity or an Historic Brilliant Balance between Peace and Justice in Victims’/Justice Agreement?
  • 18) Pres. Santos Ceding Too Much or Not?
  • 19) Would Pres. Santos’ Cure Be Worse than the Malady, or The Best, Simplest Way? The Question of Ratifying an Eventual Overall Peace Accord
  • 20) Former President/Now Senator Uribe’s Possible Next Moves? The Retired Military Voice, Political Parties
  • 21) Other Questions about the Victims’/Justice Agreement
  • 22) Extradition, Cooperation on International Judicial and Security Issues
  • 23) The FARC’s “Simon Trinidad”
  • 24) A Decision Boils Down to…
  • Sidebar: Some of the Hardest Issues to Resolve at This Juncture in Colombian Peace Process

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Sidebar: Some of the Hardest Issues to Resolve at This Juncture in Colombian Peace Process

What about the FARC and extradition?

What about the FARC's "Simon Trinidad"?

Justice or impunity?

Will time run out on Pres. Santos?

A "Memo of Understanding" to End War, if March 23 "deadline" Is Missed?

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